Reforming Foreign Military Sales
A Critical Step for Strengthening U.S. Alliances.
Given the dangerous nature of today’s international environment, characterized by growing geopolitical tensions and shifting balances of power, the importance of solid alliances could not be more critical. As the former Qatari Defence Attaché to the United States, I have witnessed the intricacies of international relationships concerning defense. Perhaps no aspect of these relationships is more important than the United States’ Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. A key pillar of US foreign policy for decades, the FMS has grown to be a clear leader in the international arms trade. However, in today’s rapidly evolving international environment, the FMS urgently requires reform.
The FMS program, which is authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), is supposed to allow US allies to purchase defense articles and services that bolster their security and, in turn, add to global stability. But, as Pentagon, State Department, and Congressional efforts this year have made clear, the system is riddled with inefficiencies and red tape that erode its efficacy. Instead, the US finds itself increasingly disconnected from its allies, as unresponsive procurement processes force them to face late deliveries and antiquated mechanisms that leave them unable to act as dependable partners.
Recent events in Ukraine have highlighted these issues in stark relief. The speed and determination with which the US has supplied weapons to Kyiv have raised uncomfortable questions for other allies: Why is the system unable to move with the same speed on our behalf? The reality is that, despite the US’s capacity to be a fast and responsive ally, the FMS system frequently constrains it from being so. This is, at best, a logistical problem. At worst, it’s a strategic vulnerability that threatens to degrade trust and undermine alliances.
"The reality is that, despite the US’s capacity to be a fast and responsive ally, the FMS system frequently constrains it from being so. This is, at best, a logistical problem. At worst, it’s a strategic vulnerability that threatens to degrade trust and undermine alliances."
For US allies such as the Gulf Cooperation Council nations (GCC), which have long depended on US military support to maintain regional stability, the inefficiencies in the FMS program can have serious consequences. Delays in the delivery of critical defense systems not only undermine the immediate security requirements of US partners but also affect their longer-term force planning. In an age where threats can evolve rapidly and unpredictably, the capacity to respond quickly is vital. A reformed FMS system that promotes speed, efficiency, and strategic consistency would better equip US allies to maintain their security while reaffirming the United States’ role as a leader in global security.
The problem, however, is not just the Middle East. In Europe, the pace of FMS has been a topic of much discussion, especially as countries there grapple with a much more aggressive Russia. The Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – have repeatedly complained about the pace of the delivery of US defense equipment to them: it is essential to their deterrence posture, and without a timely delivery of the US equipment, their defense capabilities are weakened, potentially endangering their security. A strong military presence on NATO’s eastern flank – ready to immediately support the Baltic states in case of a Russian attack – is dependent on the timely arrival of crucial military systems. Any lags undermine their security and cast doubt on the US as a defense partner.
Taiwan’s predicament is perhaps the most blatant manifestation of these inefficiencies in Asia: under a constant threat of military action from China, the island has ordered several billion dollars worth of hardware from the US, much of which has not been delivered. Delays in fighter jets, missiles, and other critical systems have left Taiwan vulnerable to Chinese coercion. If the US is to be seen as a reliable partner in Asia, especially in its efforts to contain the rise of Chinese power, it should clean up inefficiencies in its military sales process.
In Africa, meanwhile, where protracted delivery times and sheer red tape can make the difference between success and failure in counterterrorism operations, delays can also mean the difference between being successful and being left on the back burner by US partners such as Nigeria, which is presently fighting the extremist group Boko Haram. If the US wants to retain and enhance its partnerships on the continent, it needs an FMS program that is responsive to the needs and interests of African countries.
"The stakes could not be higher. In an era where alliances are the foundation of global stability, the United States must do everything it can to solidify ties with its partners. Reforming the Foreign Military Sales process is not merely a bureaucratic task; it is a strategic imperative that will determine the course of US leadership and global stability going forward."
One of the biggest problems with the current FMS regime is its lack of cohesion. Divided up among the State Department, Pentagon, and Congress, it’s often in the grips of its own processes and procedures. Recent reforms aimed at streamlining processes, such as new roundtable interagency meetings between the combatant commands and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, are a step in the right direction. However, they need to go further. A wholesale reform of the system that reduces overlapping processes brings more transparency, and flexes to meet the demands of the new security environment is needed.
A third, even more consequential reform is for the US to realign its defense exports to reflect the shifting strategic needs of its allies. Too many US defense exports are oriented more toward the US domestic market than the security needs of the partner country. For instance, Singapore, a long-time US defense partner, has expressed frustration at the US military-technology bureaucracy’s emphasis on US domestic-industrial considerations, even when these distort alliance sales and cooperation. As a result, there are mismatches between the capability and readiness of US allies and partners and US platforms and capabilities. Through greater collaboration with allies, the US can tailor its support to better reflect the unique strategic needs and priorities of its partners and thereby maximize the effectiveness of its partnerships.
Further, the FMS organization must have the means to cope with increased demand for US weaponry, given heightened geopolitical tensions. The fact that foreign military sales already topped $80 billion in the current fiscal year is an indicator of the growing reliance on US defense systems. However, as that demand grows, the FMS process hasn’t scaled up enough to make it more efficient. As the defense industrial base struggles to keep up with orders, policymakers must foster production capacity through export controls that are truly streamlined.
In the end, whether or not US foreign policy succeeds in the 21st century depends on how well it can reckon with new realities. The unchanged FMS program is a vestige of a vanished world, one that no longer exists in a world that moves too quickly and is interconnected in too many ways. Reforming that vital arsenal can better equip the US to enable its allies to contribute to the global security balance. At present, US allies are mere recipients of US military hardware. With FMS reform, these nations can become genuine partners in this shared endeavor.
The stakes could not be higher. In an era where alliances are the foundation of global stability, the United States must do everything it can to solidify ties with its partners. Reforming the Foreign Military Sales process is not merely a bureaucratic task; it is a strategic imperative that will determine the course of US leadership and global stability going forward.
